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Creating a life to save a life? Reflections on the conception of “saviour siblings”  
 
Eric Blyth 
 
Introduction 
 
The term “saviour siblings” refers to children whose conception is – at least partially – 
motivated by the desire of their parents to secure human stem cells to provide 
treatment for an existing child with a life-threatening illness. It has comparatively recent 
origins, Spriggs and Savulescu (2002) making the first specific reference to “saviour 
sibling”, although an article entitled “The Made-to-Order Savior” had appeared a year 
earlier in the New York Times Magazine (Belkin, 2001). 
 
While conceiving a child to act as a potential donor of tissue for an older sibling is not 
new (see, for example, McBride, 1990), what is new about using reproductive 
technology techniques is the explicit conscription of health care professionals and the 
state (where this has an interest in regulating the activities of health care professionals) 
in the enterprise. 
Using reproductive technology to conceive a saviour sibling 
Key to the procedure is preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), which involves the 
removal of one or two cells from an embryo that has been created in vitro using ICSI 
about three days following fertilization. The DNA from the biopsied cells is then tested 
for specific genetic conditions.  
Hitherto, a couple knowing they are at risk of conceiving a child with a severe genetic 
condition for which there is a family history had several choices (none of which is likely 
to be their first choice):  
1. They could forgo conceiving children altogether; 
2. They could forgo conceiving their own genetically-related children and pursue 
parenthood via adoption; 
3. They could use collaborative reproductive procedures such as sperm, egg or 
embryo donation or surrogacy. This could allow the “unaffected” parent to be a 
genetically-related parent of the child;  
4. The woman could undergo prenatal diagnosis (PND) following conception; this 
typically involves chorionic villus sampling during the first trimester of pregnancy 
or amniocentesis during the second trimester. A woman undergoing PND faces 
the risks inherent in the procedure itself and the decision of whether to 
terminate the pregnancy of an affected fetus.  
 
The advantage of embryo screening offered by PGD over fetal screening offered by PND 
is that a woman will know from the outset of her pregnancy that her baby is unaffected 
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by the condition and that she will not be required to undergo pregnancy termination. 
PGD may therefore be a preferable option to PND for physical, psychological and ethical 
reasons. 
 
The first application of PGD in humans was reported in 1989 (Handyside et al., 1989) 
and the first pregnancies were reported in 1990 (Handyside et al., 1990). Initial data 
from the first IVF pregnancies following PGD (12 singletons and four twins) showed a 
normal obstetric outcome (Soussis et al., 1996).  
 
Currently PGD can be used to detect more than 100 genetic conditions. Its two most 
common uses are, first, to diagnose single gene conditions, such as cystic fibrosis, 
thalassaemia, and spinal muscular atrophy; and, second, to determine the sex of an 
embryo, which has therapeutic application for sex-linked conditions, such as Duchenne’s 
muscular dystrophy and haemophilia – in which case a female embryo would be 
selected for implantation in order to avoid the birth of an affected child. The ability to 
determine an embryo’s sex opens up the possibility of using or discarding an embryo 
simply on the basis of whether it would become a boy or a girl. However, discussion of 
this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
PGD is still a relatively new procedure; it requires expertise in reproductive 
endocrinology, embryology and molecular genetics and is, consequently, extremely 
expensive. In the absence of funding for PGD through public health or health insurance 
programmes, it is unlikely to be affordable by more than a minority of the small number 
of people who have children with the serious genetic conditions for which it can be 
applied. Currently, there are three main safety questions for the use of PGD: the 
creation of the embryo by means of ICSI, the risks of the biopsy, and the risks of 
misdiagnosis.  
 
ICSI was originally developed to enable subfertile men to father a genetically-related 
child, although indications for its usage have extended considerably. International 
follow-up studies of ICSI-conceived children up to the age of 5 show that in most 
respects, singleton, full-term ICSI-conceived children are similar to their naturally-
conceived peers. However, they appear to be at higher risk of major congenital 
malformations, in particular genitourinary conditions in ICSI-conceived boys. This is 
thought to result from the quality of the sperm typically used in ICSI rather than from 
the ICSI procedure itself (Bonduelle et al., 2005). This is unlikely, therefore, to be a 
salient factor in the conception of a “saviour sibling”. However, continuing follow-up is 
necessary to ensure that ICSI does not entail unacceptable longer-term risks.  
 
While there is no current evidence that the removal of a single cell significantly impairs 
embryo development (Björndahl and Barratt, 2002), there are insufficient data to 
ascertain the effect of removing two cells (which reduces the risk of misdiagnosis) on 
either the embryo or resulting child (Shenfield et al., 2003). Over 1000 children have 
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been born following PGD (Lavery, 2004; Verlinsky et al., 2004a) and a study of 754 PGD 
babies published in 2004 showed that they are no more likely to be affected by birth 
defects than babies conceived naturally (Verlinsky et al., 2004b). Since the infants 
involved in these studies are still very young, continued monitoring will be necessary  to 
ensure that there are no long term adverse implications.  
 
Since the first clinical applications of PGD there have been occasional reports of 
misdiagnosis in most of the major international centres offering PGD, although these 
were more common in the early years and remain relatively rare occurrences (Lavery, 
2004; Verlinsky et al., 2004a). Subsequent use of PND may, of course, be used to check 
for PGD misdiagnosis. 
 
Developments in embryo research have meant that PGD, combined with Human 
Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) typing, commonly known as “tissue typing”, could not only be 
used to ensure that an embryo is unaffected by a condition for which a diagnostic test 
exists, but also to ascertain whether the child it might subsequently become would be a 
matched tissue donor for an existing affected sibling requiring a stem cell transplant. 
Since the same biopsy undertaken for PGD can be used to test for tissue typing, the 
embryo is exposed to no additional risk. Donation of cord blood stem cells itself is a non-
invasive procedure, and there is no postnatal intervention involving the “saviour sibling” 
– and therefore no risk of physical harm.  
 
The ethical debate 
 
While the technology exists to enable the conception of a “saviour sibling”, this does not 
necessarily mean that it should be permitted. Three main arguments against permitting 
the conception of “saviour siblings” have been advanced: first, the wrongful 
instrumentalization of the child; second, the “slippery slope”; and third, the welfare of 
the child (Pennings et al., 2002; Sheldon and Wilkinson, 2004). 
 
Conceiving a child to be a donor for an older sibling is considered to be inherently wrong 
because “the whole reason for conceiving that child is for the sake of someone else” 
Campbell (2004). However, this assertion may be challenged on two fronts. First is the 
issue of whether the “whole reason” for conceiving the child is for the benefit of the 
older sibling. Verlinsky et al. (2004a: 2080) state that “each of the couples desired to 
have another child - a desire separate from the hope of having another child who could 
potentially serve as a donor of stem cells for the affected sibling”. It is also reported that 
the parents in two UK families, the Hashmis and the Whitakers, that have been at the 
centre of the “saviour sibling” debate in the UK, wanted another child in any case 
(Sheldon and Wilkinson, 2004: 537, note 18). Second, if we consider “saviour siblings” in 
the wider context of reasons for having children, it does not take too long to realize that 
“pure” motivations, i.e. wanting a child exclusively for her own sake may, in reality be 
quite elusive. Many children are “born with a mission” - to save a marriage, to provide 
an heir, to maintain the family name, to provide grand-parents with a grand-child, to 
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provide a sibling with a playmate, to complete a family, to save a country.  It may 
therefore be argued that conceiving a child as a “saviour sibling” simply extends the 
circumstances in which children may be conceived, rather than being qualitatively 
different. Finally, it seems counter intuitive to suggest that parents who would 
contemplate undergoing IVF and tissue typing to conceive a child are likely to take an 
instrumental view of their children. Indeed, it seems more plausible to suggest that 
parents taking an instrumental view of their children are more likely to abandon their 
sick child to her fate and put their efforts into conceiving a healthy child.  
 
The “slippery slope” argument suggests that a particular action will lead inexorably to 
something else that is either less desirable or even clearly wrong – so the first step 
should not be taken. If the conception of a “saviour siblings” is permitted, what is to 
stop the conception of “saviour sons”, “saviour daughters”, “saviour cousins”, “saviour 
nieces”, “saviour nephews”, “saviour friends”, “saviour next-door-neighbours”, even 
“saviour strangers”? Where would the line be drawn – if at all – at the persons in whose 
favour the proposed donor child is conceived? If the conception of “saviour siblings” for 
the donation of cord blood stem cells is permitted, what is to stop donation ending 
there? If the conception of “saviour siblings” is permitted to ensure certain 
characteristics - in this case tissue compatibility - what is to prevent the conception of 
children on the basis of other “desirable” characteristics, such as eye colour, hair colour, 
IQ, personality, and sex? While it is currently not possible to design a composite “wish 
list” child, who is to say that the genuine “designer baby” could not be created by future 
technological development? 
 
In response to these challenges, it may be countered that there is no inherent reason 
why permitting the conception of a “saviour sibling” should lead to any of the 
anticipated consequences (Indeed, libertarians would reject the idea that - at least some 
of - these consequences are necessarily ones to be avoided - see for example, Harris, 
1998; Robertson, 2003). But assuming that these consequences should be resisted, it is 
self-evidently possible through regulation to devise criteria that permit selection for 
some purposes but not others – as occurs in the UK. 
 
Consideration of the welfare of the child involves both the child’s physical and 
psychological well-being. As regards physical safety, the available evidence discussed 
above suggests that there are no current indications of physical harm, at least in the 
short-term. While these initial indications are reassuring, follow-up studies are 
necessary to ensure that this continues to be the case in the longer-term. When we 
consider the psychological well-being of “saviour siblings”, there is no empirical 
evidence at all, although there has been considerable speculation on both sides of the 
argument. 
 
Opponents have questioned the accuracy of the testing procedure and wonder about 
the possible consequences of mis-diagnosis - as a result of which the intended “saviour 
sibling” is either affected by the genetic condition or is not a suitable tissue match after 
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all. Concerns have been expressed about possible parental attitudes towards the 
“saviour sibling” and the possibility that her welfare might be subordinated to that of 
the older child. Unease has also been expressed about the potential psychological 
consequences on a “saviour sibling’” finding out that she was wanted not for herself, 
but as a means to save the life of her sick sibling. Fears have also been expressed about 
the impact on the “saviour sibling’s” relationships with other family members. If the 
donation is unsuccessful, she may be blamed for not fulfilling expectations, especially if 
the older sibling dies. Alternatively, there may be demands for her to donate bone 
marrow for a subsequent transplant (see, for example CORE, 2004). 
 
Advocates have been no less speculative. The act of saving an “existing, loved child …… 
would only increase [the] specialness of the [‘saviour sibling’+”  (Robertson, 2003: 468). 
Sheldon and Wilkinson (2004) consider that she might derive pleasure from knowing 
that she has saved her sibling’s life and would benefit from the saved child’s company. 
Even though the “saviour sibling” might derive no direct personal benefit from acting as 
a donor, any risk of harm to which she might be exposed needs to be balanced against 
the welfare of the existing child. There are suggestions that it is more appropriate to 
consider the welfare of the “saviour sibling”, not in isolation, but within the context of 
the family on the grounds that her social, emotional and psychological interests depend 
on the welfare of the family in which she grows up. Therefore, saving the life of her 
sibling is in her best interests also as this will ensure a happier family, from which she 
will herself benefit (Savulescu, 1996). Sheldon and Wilkinson (2004: 536) suggest that 
the “saviour sibling” will benefit by not having grieving parents, and further hypothesize 
that the alternative to a successful “saviour sibling” is a child who is unable to act as a 
tissue donor: “imagine the psychological impact on [the latter child], born into a 
bereaved family and later to discover that she was a huge disappointment to her 
parents because of her inability to save *the sick child’s+ life”. 
 
Circumstances under which a “saviour sibling” may be conceived 
 
There is no avoiding the fact that prohibiting the use of PGD and tissue typing to 
conceive a “saviour sibling” will result in the deaths of children who might otherwise 
have been saved. Nevertheless, if the consequences of the solution are “worse” than 
the original problem, then we should not implement it.  It seems to me that, at present, 
the case for prohibiting the conception of “saviour siblings” is not sufficiently compelling 
to prevent us from at least trying to save the lives of these children where the 
conception of a “saviour sibling” might provide the chance to do so. Pennings and 
Liebars (2002) refer to the “post-natal test”: if it is unacceptable to use an existing child 
in a particular way, then it is also unacceptable to conceive a child for the same purpose. 
However, if it  acceptable to use an existing child as a sibling donor, then it is also 
acceptable to conceive a child to act as a donor for a sibling, so long as the future child’s 
needs are considered. This seems to provide an acceptable philosophical basis for 
developing a policy on “saviour sibling”. 
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In the UK, the conception of a “saviour sibling” using a “treatment service” as defined 
under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, must have regard to the 
requirement of S (13) 5 that: 
 
“a woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken 
of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the 
need of that child for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the 
birth.” 
 
Uniquely among existing legislation that recognises the welfare of children involved in 
assisted conception, the 1990 Act specifically recognises the position of “of any other 
child”. While British parliamentarians can hardly have had “saviour siblings” in mind 
when the legislation was passed, Section 13 (5) provides a clear opportunity to ensure 
that the welfare of existing children is taken into account when considering the 
conception of any child by means of “treatment services”.  
 
In the wake of the legal challenge to its original decision in the Hashmi case, the HFEA 
has made clear its approval in principle for tissue typing either in conjunction with PGD 
(to ensure that the embryo is both free of the tested condition and a potential tissue 
match) or on its own (to ensure only that that the embryo is a potential tissue match). 
However, all applications will continue to be considered on a case-by-case basis. At the 
same time, the HFEA has provided details of the conditions which must be met and the 
procedures it expects centres to undertake (HFEA 2004).    
 
Self-evidently, the implications of conceiving “saviour siblings” will become apparent 
only over time. The HFEA recognises the importance of research evidence in providing 
this information, to the extent that families should be “strongly encouraged” to 
participate in follow-up studies, including long-term medical and psychosocial follow up 
of children born as a result (HFEA, 2004: 14.27/3; 14.27/4). Researchers and service 
providers must, however, respect families’ rights to privacy and their desire to lead as 
normal a life as possible, and must avoid any suspicion that access to services is 
dependent on agreement to participate in longer-term research.  
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